The rhetoric of Sir Isaac Newton\u27s Principia: a rejection of Cartesianism by Fite, Charles L.
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1992
The rhetoric of Sir Isaac Newton's Principia: a
rejection of Cartesianism
Charles L. Fite
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Business and Corporate Communications Commons, and the Rhetoric and
Composition Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fite, Charles L., "The rhetoric of Sir Isaac Newton's Principia: a rejection of Cartesianism" (1992). Retrospective Theses and
Dissertations. 127.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/127
The rhetoric of Sir Isaac Newton's Principia: A rejection of Cartesian ism 
Approved: 
I 
by 
Charles Lee Fite 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
Department: 
Major: 
English 
English (Business and Technical 
Communication) 
For the Major Department 
For the Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1992 
Signature redacted for privacy
Signature redacted for privacy
Signature redacted for 
privacy
i i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ISAAC NEWTON'S RHETORIC: INFLUENCES AND DIRECTIONS 1 
Introduction 1 
Bazerman's Account of Newton's Rhetoric 4 
A More Comprehensive View of Newton's Rhetoric 7 
Newton and Greek Geometry 1 0 
Newton's Mechanical Theory 1 4 
Cartesian and Euclidean Rhetoric 1 6 
Cartesian rhetoric 1 8 
Newton and Cartesian rhetoric 2 7 
Euclidean rhetoric 3 0 
AN ANALYSIS OF NEWTON'S RHETORIC 3 3 
The "New Theory" Article and Cartesian Rhetoric 3 4 
The discovery narrative 3 5 
The doctrine of colours 3 7 
The Principia and Newton's New Rhetorical Strategy 4 1 
Deductive and inductive structure in the Principia 4 4 
Analytic argument and its accompanying scholia 4 7 
Euclidean format and the "System of the World" 54 
iii 
Conclusions 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
WORKS CITED 
APPENDIX: CREATIVE PERIODS IN THE LIFE OF NEWTON 
Optics 
Celestial Mechanics 
Greek Mathematics 
60 
63 
64 
66 
68 
68 
72 
1 
ISAAC NEWTON'S RHETORIC: 
INFLUENCES AND DIRECTIONS 
Introduction 
Often when we think of scientists, we imagine observers 
painstakingly recording the results of experiments and the effects of 
natural phenomena, or we imagine theorists standing in front of dusty 
chalk boards working out the details of protracted mathematical 
expressions. Seldom do we picture scientists as writers, yet most 
scientists spend a substantial fraction of their time writing. Scientists, 
just as other scholars, must communicate with their colleagues. And 
although mathematics, as well as other media, plays an important role 
in scientific discourse, the writing of scientists remains their primary 
mode of communication. 
Because of its vital role in scientific discovery, scientific writing 
and its role in scientific discourse have, in recent years, been recognized 
by rhetorical theorists as a legitimate avenue of study. One of the most 
interesting and important methods of understanding scientific discourse 
is to study its origins and development over the years. The first, and 
arguably the most, important period for the development of modern 
scientific discourse (particularly in English) is the second half of the 
seventeenth-century in England-the early days of the Royal Society and 
the days of Isaac Newton in his prime. The discourse that evolved in 
the publications of the world's first scientific journal, Transactions of the 
Royal Society, was to set the standard upon which modern scientific 
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discourse in both the natural and the social sciences would be modeled. 
And not surprisingly, Isaac Newton was to help shape that discourse. 
The first days of the Royal Society and the 'plain style' movement 
have long been recognized as an important influence on the style of 
scientifi-c prose. The deliberate attempt by the hierarchy of the Royal 
Society to eliminate 'ornateness' in the language of its members helped 
to shape the prose of Enlightenment scientists and the generations who 
have followed them. Arguably, the Royal Society's influence affected 
not only scientific prose style, but modern literary prose style as well 
(Jones; Croll; Adolph). Isaac Newton, however, had little to do with the 
'plain style' movement. He appears to have adopted the style with little 
or no effort, but Newton was just beginning graduate work at 
Cambridge when Sprat's History was published in 1667. And although 
Newton's undergraduate studies had included Aristotle and Plato, he 
seriously digested only the more contemporary figures, in particular 
Descartes. His readings also included Royal Society members (i.e., 
Joseph Glanville, Robert Boyle) (Westfall 87-89). Thus it seems safe to 
assume that Newton was aware of and quickly adopted the plain prose 
style. 
Although Isaac Newton most likely had little or no influence upon 
prose style, his influence on the content and organization of the 
scientific article was immense. In Shaping Written Knowledge, Charles 
Bazerman studies the literary forms that emerged in the Transactions of 
the Royal Society, their influence on the discourse of the physical 
sciences, and their subsequent influence on the discourse of the social 
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sciences. Bazerman argues that the deductive, closed, "Euclidean" 
system of argument that Newton eventually developed in Book I of the 
Opticks was to provide the model for the "communal" closed systems 
that scientific argument would eventually create. 
In Chapter IV, "Between Books and Articles: Newton Faces 
Controversy," Bazerman demonstrates how Isaac Newton's strategies for 
presenting his optical theory changed as his conception of the rhetorical 
situation was altered. More specifically, Bazerman argues that Newton's 
attempts to answer his colleagues' critiques of his first and, with one 
minor exception, his only journal article, "A New Theory of Light and 
Colours," actually helped him to clarify and reorganize his theory into 
the extremely-compelling deductive argument (what Bazerman calls 
"the Juggernaut as Persuasion") that later appeared as Book I of the 
Opticks. 
My analysis of Newton's Philosophice Natura/is Principia 
Mathematica will build upon Bazerman's work, confirming that much as 
with the optical theory, Newton's mechanical and gravitational theory 
were shaped by his perception of the rhetorical situation. In addition, 
my analysis will suggest that Newton's development of his deductive 
"juggernaut" was also influenced by his writing of the Principia and the 
events leading up to that writing. Bazerman doesn't analyze the writing 
of the Principia because he is more interested in influences on the mode 
of argument taking place in the Transactions, and he believes that the 
argument in Book I of the Opticks "had a more immediate and powerful 
impact than the abstract machine of the Principia" (126). Nevertheless, 
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to fully understand the influences on Newton's creation of the 
deductive, closed text used by Book I of the Opticks, it is necessary to 
examine the writing of the Principia, an earlier work that also used the 
Euclidean, closed system of argument found in Book I of the Opticks. 
Bazerman's Account of Newton's Rhetoric 
A general consensus among historians is that Isaac Newton's 
emotional constitution prevented him from tolerating scrutiny and 
constructive criticism of his theories. Following the criticism of his "New 
Theory" article, Newton withdrew from publication and became 
defensive and mistrustful of sharing his ideas with others until they 
were fully developed and could not be questioned. While it is true that 
Newton's psyche would have provided interesting study for students of 
paranoia, Bazerman offers an alternate explanation for Newton's shock 
at the plethora of criticism that followed the "New Theory" article. 
According to Bazerman, Newton failed to recognize the value of 
the newly created scientific journal as a forum for scientific argument, 
perceiving it rather as a forum for publishing newly discovered facts. 
Newton published the "New Theory" article to acquaint the scientific 
community with his theory and prepare the community for his 
forthcoming book. He did not expect criticism, instead expecting that 
the ·credibility as a competent observer that he established for himself 
would persuade his readers to accept (at least tentatively) the 
conclusions he drew from his experiments. Newton therefore 
interpreted the resulting critiques of his theory as personal attacks 
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upon his competence, rather than as the legitimate questions and 
objections of his colleagues about elements of his reasoning and about 
details of his experimental method (89). 
Although Newton misunderstood the function of the scientific 
journal, Bazerman argues that Newton did (perhaps intuitively) 
recognize the importance of an effective presentation for the "facts" he 
had discovered. Thus the "New Theory" article begins with an account 
of Newton as the competent Baconian observer who, through careful 
experiment, -discovers some unusual phenomena and systematically 
goes about isolating and testing them, leading eventually to a theory to 
explain the phenomena. Bazerman argues that Newton intentionally 
chose this "discovery" mode to establish credibility for his experiments 
and, thereby, for himself and his argument (90-91). Articles in the 
Transactions at that time commonly used the experimental narrative, 
and Newton read and took notes on those articles before ever writing 
his own (88). Additionally, Newton's private journals indicate that the 
experiments were actually carried out to prove his hypotheses rather 
than stumbled across accidentally as the article suggests (92-93 ). Thus, 
according to Bazerman, the empirical account was Newton's solution to 
his rhetorical problem rather than a description of actual events. 
Having established his credibility as a good Bacon ian observer, 
Newton expected his readers to quickly accept his conclusions about the 
phenomena. However, Bazerman argues that the highly inductive 
structure of the experimental narrative used by Newton, accompanied 
by his failure to provide procedural detail, prevented such acceptance 
---~----"---- "---- ------- --
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and is thus responsible for the degree of criticism he received 
concerning the "New Theory" article. Newton did not link his 
propositions directly to his experimental results. He also assumed his 
readers could fill in experimental details that he left out for the sake of 
conciseness. Because of these flaws in his presentation, Newton's 
colleagues were not satisfied with his logic (1 00-11 0). 
Through answering the critiques of Robert Hooke, Christian 
Huygens, and others, Newton developed new strategies for leading 
others to his conclusions. He realized the importance of providing 
specific procedural details of his experimental evidence, and he 
discovered the value of providing a deductive structure for showing 
direct relationships between his theory and that evidence. Thus, 
Bazerman argues that through answering the critiques of his colleagues, 
Newton developed the more effective rhetorical strategies that would 
characterize his later work (100-110). 
According to Bazerman, Newton's ultimate solution to his 
rhetorical problem (presenting his theory as fact), as it appeared in the 
Opticks decades after the "New Theory" controversy, was to develop 
what modern literary theory calls a "closed text" (124). "The form of 
compelling argument [Newton] developed," claims Bazerman, "relied on 
creating a closed system of experience, perception, thought, and 
representation that reduced opposing arguments to error" (83). Newton 
defined a few quantities that he perceived existing in nature. Using 
those definitions, he developed axioms (or laws) based upon his 
observation of the workings of nature that described how those defined 
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quantities interact with each other. Using the axioms and logical (often 
mathematical) rigor, Newton demonstrated that his propositions led 
directly to the experimental results he described. Thus, once the axioms 
in Book I of the Opticks are accepted, scrupulous logic leads the reader 
inexorably to the propositions. 
So, as Bazerman notes, a closed text does not allow for alternate 
interpretations. According to Bazerman, the only voice in the text is 
that of the author. The extremely compelling argument in Book I of the 
Opticks moves 
from definition to axiom to propositiOns. The propositions, 
supported by experimental proofs, are sequentially 
arranged to create an ironclad deductive argument. . . 
(Bazerman 119). 
Books II and III, however, retain a more tentative, hypothetical tone, 
indicating Newton's lack of experimental evidence to support his 
propositions (125). Nevertheless, the deductive argument in Book I, 
Bazerman argues, was not only an important influence on optical theory, 
but was a profound influence on the format of the scientific paper in the 
eighteenth century and contributed to Newton's dominant presence in 
eighteenth-century science (127). 
A More Comprehensive View of Newton's Rhetoric 
That Newton misunderstood the rhetorical nature of scientific 
argument is well established by Bazerman (see also The Myth of 
Metaphor by Colin Murray Turbayne). Bazerman's analysis also clearly 
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demonstrates that the "New Theory" criticism and Newton's responses 
to it were vital to the creation of the 'Euclidean' argument found in both 
the Principia and the Opticks. However, it is not clear from Bazerman's 
analysis that the optical criticism and its aftermath were the only 
influences. Indeed there is good reason to believe that Newton's writing 
of the Principia and the events leading up to it also played a vital role in 
the creation of his Euclidean mode of argument. 
The event that suggests there could be other influences is a fire 
that took place in Newton's Cambridge office during the winter of 
1677/1678-a fire that destroyed a nearly complete book-length 
manuscript of Newton's optical theory. Following the period of 
controversy surrounding the "New Theory" article (1672-1676), 
Newton, spurred on by answering his critics, had nearly completed his 
optical theory by late 1677. Then apparently in December 1677 or 
early 1678, a catastrophic fire in Newton's office destroyed the 
manuscript, and along with it, Newton's willingness to continue his 
study of optics (Bazerman 119; Westfall 276-279; see also the appendix 
to the present work). 
After the fire, Newton abandoned optics for over a decade. During 
this time, he first seriously studied Greek mathematics; he developed 
his calculus and principles of mechanics; and he wrote and published 
the Principia-his explanation of the mechanics of our universe and his 
outright attack upon the mechanics of Descartes. It was not until the 
1690s that Newton again took up his optical studies, and not until 1704 
that he published the Opticks. Thus, the Principia may have actually 
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been the first 'Euclidean' text produced by Newton because we simply 
don't know what the optical manuscript destroyed by the fire looked 
like. 
While we don't know the exact appearance of the optical 
manuscript, evidence provided by Bazerman compels one to believe 
that Newton was beginning to recognize the value of a deductive 
organization and was looking to mathematics for a method of 
presentation in the period prior to the fire. Actually, as early as 
September 1672, Newton was beginning to consider reducing his 
argument to a mathematical form. In a letter written to Henry 
Oldenberg, Newton states, 
I drew up a series of such Expts on designe to reduce ye 
Theory of colours to Propositions & prove each Proposition 
from one or more of those Expts by the assistance of 
common notices set down in the form of Definitions & 
Axioms in imitation of the Method by web Mathematicians 
are wont to prove their doctrines (qtd in Bazerman 113; 
Newton "Correspondence" 237-238). 
Thus, only months after the "New Theory" article was published (after 
the first round of controversy, as Bazerman describes it), Newton was 
already looking to mathematics and its use of stated definitions and 
axioms to build evidence for propositions. 
The passage cited above and other evidence provided by 
Bazerman indicate that Newton was certainly beginning to consider 
using a 'mathematical' style of argument during his first period of 
optical writing (1672-1677). However, it is still unclear whether the 
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manuscript destroyed by the fire used the same closed, step-by-step, 
Euclidean system used by both the Principia and the Opticks. In 
attempting to reconstruct steps m Newton's creative process, we cannot 
ignore the obvious influence that ancient Greek geometry must have 
had on the development of a "Euclidean" text. In the years following 
the fire in his office, Newton developed a great appreciation for the 
ancient Greeks' geometric, rather than (Cartesian) algebraic, method of 
presenting mathematical relationships (see Appendix). Thus, it seems 
quite likely that Newton's eventual creation of two Euclidean texts, the 
Opticks and the Principia, was also influenced by his growing esteem for 
Greek geometry. In considering this influence, we must turn our 
attention to the period following Newton's first optical writings (1678-
1687). This period includes Newton's study of Greek mathematics, his 
subsequent rejection of Cartesian mathematics and mechanics, and his 
writing of the Principia. Through a study of this period, we will find 
that Newton's adoption of a 'Euclidean' rhetoric was part and parcel of 
his rejection of 'Cartesian' rhetoric. 
Newton and Greek Geometry 
Throughout his career, Newton studied and was fascinated by 
mathematics. As a student Newton, like everyone else of his day, 
became a devotee of the mathematics of Descartes, and it was not until 
much later in his career (apparently around 1678 or 1679; see 
Appendix) that Newton seriously studied the ancient Greeks. Following 
this study of Euclid, Apollonius, Pappus, and others, Newton again read 
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and attempted to work through Descartes' Geometry. From this time 
forward, Newton came to prefer the geometry of the ancient Greeks 
over the algebra of Descartes. In fact, during the following years 
Newton rejected virtually everything Cartesian-mathematics, 
mechanics, metaphysics, and rhetoric. 
Newton's rejection of Cartesian algebra in favor of the Greek's 
geometry as a method of presentation is well documented. Attesting to 
Newton's high regard for the Greek geometers, Henry Pemberton, who 
prepared the Principia's third edition for Newton, claimed: 
Of their taste, and form of demonstration Sir Isaac always 
professed himself a great admirer: I have heard him even 
censure himself for not following them yet more closely 
than he did; and speak with regret of his mistake at the 
beginning of his mathematical studies, in applying himself to 
the works of Des Cartes and other algebraic writers, before 
he had considered the elements of Euclide with that 
attention, which so excellent a writer deserves (Pemberton, 
Preface; See also, Westfall 378 ). 
It is therefore clear that Newton underwent a conversion m which he 
discarded the algebraic representations of Descartes and other 
seventeenth-century mathematicians in favor of the geometry of the 
ancient Greeks. What is not so clear, but might also be included in 
Pemberton's statement, is that Newton also rejected Descartes' 
organization ("taste, and form of demonstration") in favor of Euclid's. 
What is also unclear in Pemberton's statement is that Newton 
preferred the "synthetic," geometric representations only for presenting 
his results, but still retained the "analytic," algebra for discovering those 
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results. Indeed Newton made several statements about what he 
believed were the proper roles of geometry and the new Analysis 
(algebra). In the introduction to his solution of a locus problem (written 
m the late 1670s, about the same time as the problem), Newton refers 
to the ancient Greeks: 
To be sure, their method is more elegant by far than the 
Cartesian one. For he [Descartes] achieved the result by an 
algebraic calculus, which when transposed into words 
(following the practice of the Ancients in their writings), 
would prove to be so tedious and entangled as to provoke 
nausea, nor might it be understood. But they accomplished 
it by simple proportions, judging that nothing written in a 
different style was worthy to be read, and in consequence 
concealing the analysis by which they found their 
constructions (Newton "Wastebook"; Whiteside "Papers IV" 
277; see also, Westfall 379). 
So Newton was concerned that his mathematics be presented as an 
elegant, finished product. As with his optical and mechanical theories, 
Newton was not content with anything less than a refined, holistic 
presentation, and the analytical geometry of Descartes he considered too 
turgid and vulgar for presentation. Readers were to be given an elegant 
presentation whereby they could understand the major implications of 
the mathematics, even if they were unable to work through the details 
themselves. 
Working through those details was in fact impossible for most 
readers. Newton's demonstrations presented in their geometric forms 
were not nearly so conducive to understanding as the algebraic 
formulations. Newton was clearly aware of this fact, but was 
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apparently willing to forego ease of understanding so that he could 
present his results in the more elegant, "synthetic" fashion. In relation 
to one of the many disputes in which he was involved (circa 1715), 
Newton published the following passage anonymously in the 
Transactions. 
By the help of the new Analysis Mr. Newton found out most 
of the Propositions in his Principia Philosophite : but because 
the Ancients for making things certain admitted nothing into 
Geometry before it was demonstrated synthetically, that the 
Systeme of the Heavens might be founded upon good 
Geometry. And this makes it now difficult for unskilful Men 
to see the Analysis by which those Propositions were found 
out (Transactions (29) 206; Cohen "Introduction" 295). 
Newton's decision to present his calculus in geometric formulations IS 
curious, to say the least. One of the most pronounced characteristics of 
the rhetoric in the Principia is an almost obsessive concern with 
providing every step, even seemingly inconsequential details, of the 
argument. While the details of Newton's calculus are provided by his 
geometrical demonstrations, they are, as Newton admits, beyond the 
abilities of many (actually most) readers to follow. This seeming 
inconsistency can perhaps be reconciled by considering that Newton 
was not greatly concerned about the readability of his text (the non-
mathematical parts of the argument are difficult too). Instead, it seems 
quite likely that Newton was enamored of the ancients and their elegant 
method of presentation, and that he was equally disdainful of Descartes 
and his method. If this was the case for mathematics, it seems quite 
likely that it was true for the rest of Newton's rhetoric as well. 
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Newton's Mechanical Theory 
The Principia, as published by Newton in 1687, is, m terms of 
content, a direct assault upon Cartesian mechanics. Scientists and 
historians agree that the crucial breakthrough that allowed Newton to 
go on to demonstrate that gravity controls celestial motion to the 
eventual satisfaction of the world was his rejection of Descartes' Theory 
of Vortices and the subsequent creation of his own mechanical 
(particularly dynamical) theory, where objects can act upon each other 
over a distance through forces such as gravity (Westfall 377-404; Cohen 
"Introduction" 47; Herivel 14-23; Brewster 291-299; see also Appendix). 
Newton also rejected the metaphysical justification of Cartesian 
mechanics as unsupported hypotheses; he relied instead on the 
justification that his theory simply describes what is observed, and he 
offered no attempts at explaining why the forces act as they do. 
From his early days at Cambridge, Newton had been a devotee of 
the work of Descartes. He read Descartes' Discourse on Method, and he 
studied and became thoroughly immersed in the mathematics of the 
Geometry and the mechanics of Descartes' own Philosophice Principia. 
Newton was never quite comfortable with Cartesian dualism, but he did 
study seriously Descartes' mechanical theory, in particular his 
explanation of celestial mechanics, the Theory of Vortices (Westfall 98-
100, 144, 301-304; Newton "Quaestions"). 
Descartes' theory (or hypothesis as Newton later called it) 
regarded matter as a continuous phenomenon permeating all space (at 
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least within the solar system). This matter ts arranged in "vortices" 
around massive objects such as a planet or the sun, which simply are 
composed of a denser matter, and a force (probably gravity) affects 
distant objects by displacing the continuous matter much the same way 
that a wave travels through water and sound travels through au. 
Hence, Descartes explained gravity's attraction by hypothesizing a 
medium, the "rether," for transmitting gravitational force. 
Newton's breakthrough was his adoption of the notion that forces 
such as gravity can act on distant objects without.a medium. His entire 
Universal Theory of Gravitation rests on the notion that the mass of an 
object determines its gravitational attraction to another object-an 
attraction that decreases as the square of the distance between the 
objects. According to Newton, the motions of heavenly bodies are 
controlled by the mutual attractions of those bodies. Thus, Newton's 
Principia rejected not only the mathematics but also the mechanics of 
Descartes.! 
In his authoritative biography of Newton, Richard Westfall argues 
that Newton's study of the ancient Greeks was the catalyst that caused 
Newton to discredit the whole of Descartes' mechanical philosophy. 
Now in the late 1670s, [Newton] stood poised to reject the 
fundamental tenet of Descartes' mechanical philosophy of 
In a chronological argument made in the appendix, I demonstrate that Newton appears to 
have completely dropped his optical theory (after the fire in 1678) before he made any 
breakthroughs in his mechanical theory (in 1679), and before he began seriously 
contemplating the motions of the solar system (in 1684). I also demonstrate that quite likely 
Newton's study of the ancient Greeks and his subsequent reevaluation of Cartesian 
mathematics occurred in 1678 or 1679 as well. 
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nature, that one body can act upon another only by direct 
contact. Newton's mathematical papers suggest that only a 
wholesale repudiation of his Cartesian heritage would allow 
him to take that step. The repudiation determined not only 
the content but also the form of the Principia (Westfall 381). 
So although Newton was clearly thinking about the use of mathematical 
concepts and structures in organizing his optical writing, it seems likely 
that his adoption of a 'Euclidean' rhetoric was also influenced by his 
repudiation of Cartesian mathematics and mechanics. What remains to 
confirm this hypothesis is a detailed analysis of both Cartesian and 
Euclidean rhetoric and a step-by-step comparison of Newtonian rhetoric 
to both. The remaining pages of this chapter will contain the former, 
and Chapter II will contain the latter. 
Cartesian and Euclidean Rhetoric 
Defining a single Euclidean rhetoric is a relatively simple task. 
Euclid was fairly consistent in the use of his definition-axiom-
proposition-theorem format in all of his works. Additionally, hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of mathematics textbooks have borrowed from 
Euclid for their organizations and for establishing standards of evidence. 
It is therefore simple enough to describe a single rhetoric that we can 
call Euclidean. Descartes, on the other hand, was not completely 
consistent in his style of presentation~ neither has he been used as a 
model for writers of math texts (although elements of his rhetoric have 
found their way into them). Thus, defining a single Cartesian rhetoric is 
a more daunting task. 
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Despite Descartes' variations in style, it is possible to define a 
single rhetoric against which Newton was reacting. As I mentioned 
earlier, Newton, at the very least, read Descartes' Discourse on Method, 
his Geometry, and his Principia Philosophit:£. The Discourse and the 
Geomet.ry look very similar (which is no surprise since the Geometry 
was the last of three essays appended to the Discourse). However, 
Descartes' Principia appears quite different, at least organizationally. 
Indeed, superficially, Descartes' Principia appears somewhat similar to 
the work of Euclid and to Newton's Principia in its use of explicitly 
stated propositions followed by and separated from the evidence 
supporting them. However, Descartes' Principia is similar to the 
Discourse and the Geometry in its emphasis on the ethos of the author. 
Descartes' strategies for building ethos, and the lapses in logic that they 
were used to cover, are the elements of Descartes' rhetoric that Newton 
quite likely reacted against most fiercely. And the book that makes 
most obvious use of such strategies, the Geometry, contains not 
surprisingly the first part of Descartes' 'philosophy' that Newton 
rejected-his mathematics. 
John Fauvel's "Cartesian and Euclidean Rhetoric" clearly 
demonstrates this vital difference in the rhetorical strategies of the two 
mathematicians. The Cartesian rhetoric of the Geometry relies on 
creating an immense ethos to persuade the reader when logic fails, 
while Euclidean rhetoric uses careful step-by-step logic to persuade. 
Additionally, the rhetorics of the Discourse and the Geometry use an 
inductive, narrative mode very similar to that used by Newton in the 
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"New Theory" article, while Euclid's deductive definition-axiom-
proposition organization is of course very similar to that of the 
Principia. 
Cartesian Rhetoric 
To begin with, Fauvel demonstrates that both the Discourse and 
the Geometry are first-person and, at least ostensibly, autobiographical 
narratives. In the Discourse, Descartes appears to be allowing the 
reader to overhear what Fauvel terms an "autobiographical rumination." 
According to Fauvel, 
the Discourse turns out to be a finely constructed story 
about the past persona (called "I") of a narrator (also called 
"1"), structured so as to bring out an imaginary intellectual 
journey-a fictional narrative case in the form of an 
autobiography (26). 
Fauvel' s conclusion is based largely upon the following and other similar 
passages m the first few pages of the Discourse. 
I should be glad in this discourse to describe for the benefit 
of others the paths I have followed, to paint a picture, as it 
were, of my life, of which each one may judge as he pleases; 
and I should be happy, too, to learn what public opinion has 
to say of me, and so discover a fresh mode of instruction for 
myself ... (qtd in Fauvel 25). 
Descartes makes it clear in this passage that the method of study he will 
describe in the Discourse is the result of his life's work; thus an 
autobiographical account of his life's experiences is to be used as 
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evidence for its success. The rhetoric 1s openly, in fact blatantly, 
focused upon the author, so the author's ethos is of paramount 
importance. Descartes does concede his willingness to consider the 
opmwns of others, but as Fauvel suggests, Descartes was not in fact 
desirous of criticism; he was instead trying to build his credibility by 
appearing extremely reasonable and open to suggestion. Similar overt 
attempts to build credibility are present in Newton's "New Theory" 
article as well (which also takes the form of an autobiographical 
narrative), but his strategies are of course different (more on this m 
Chapter II). 
The extent of Descartes' efforts to build his credibility are even 
more apparent in the Geometry. In a style similar to that of the 
Discourse, the Geometry begins as a first-person narrative about how to 
apply Descartes' method to mathematics. Note Descartes' numerous 
references to himself and his procedures in this description of the basics 
of his geometry at the beginning of the book. 
I have only to JOlll the points A and C, and draw DE 
parallel to CA; then BE is the product of BD and BC. 
If it be required to divide BE by BD, I join E and D, and 
draw AC parallel to DE; then BC is the result of the division. 
If the square root of GH is desired, I add, along the same 
straight line, FG equal to unity; then bisecting FH at K, I 
describe the circle FIH about K as a center, and draw from G 
a perpendicular and extend it to I, and GI is the required 
root. I do not speak here of cube root, or other roots, since I 
shall speak more conveniently of them later (5). 
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Such uses of the personal pronoun "I" are common throughout the 
Geometry, making it clear that the knowledge imparted is to be read as 
Descartes' own creation. 
However the Geometry is not simply a narrative, as the first two 
pages of the book make it appear. On the surface at least, the Geometry 
is a set of instructions. Thus the reader has a more prominent position 
than in the Discourse. According to Fauvel, the Geometry "is the story 
of young Rene and his instruments, of a craftsman inculcating you into 
the skills of his trade. The author tells you how to do things, as a 
furniture maker might" (26). Descartes is the master, thoroughly 
versed in his craft and therefore beyond question, and the reader Is the 
apprentice, struggling to develop the skill necessary to master the craft 
and often failing in the attempt. An examination of the Geometry and 
the context surrounding it makes it abundantly clear that Descartes was 
striving for this effect with all the means at his disposal, whether the 
readers were indeed neophytes only beginning their study of 
mathematics or sophisticated members of European intelligentsia. The 
success of the book and its subsequent influence are testament to the 
persuasiveness this rhetorical strategy had for Descartes' audience. 
Immediately following the description of some of the basics of 
geometry (most of which is quoted on the previous page), Descartes 
explains his practice of replacing the "lines" of geometry with the 
"letters" of algebra-maintaining his use of the personal pronoun "I" 
throughout. However, following this explanation, Descartes immediately 
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shifts to an instructional mode, marked most obviously by his use of the 
pronoun "we." 
If then, we wish to solve any problem, we first suppose the 
solution already effected, and give names to all the lines 
that seem needful for its construction,-to those that are 
unknown as well as to those that are known. Then, making 
no distinction between known and unknown lines, we must 
unravel the difficulty in any way that shows most naturally 
the relations between these lines, until we find it possible to 
express a single quantity in two ways (7, 9). 
Thus on the third page of the 120-page text, Descartes first 
acknowledges the reader's presence. Descartes has now fully 
established the stance that he will maintain throughout the text: a 
craftsman skillfully nurturing the study of a novice in the skills of his 
craft. The use of the pronoun "we" rather than "you" (or the implied 
"you" of a command) works to persuade the reader that Descartes is 
nurturing rather than merely instructing and, while Descartes 
frequently shifts back to "I" to clearly lay claim to his creation, his 
pronoun choice in general helps to create a rather informal, "chatty" 
tone that Descartes maintains throughout the text. 
Despite this informal sort of "nurturing," helpful stance that 
Descartes takes, his real goals are far from helping the reader to 
understand. Actually, what Descartes wants is for readers not to 
understand some elements of the text, yet still believe that he is doing 
everything he can to help them. Further into the text (but still early), 
Descartes makes it clear that the reader is expected to be an active 
participant in the learning process. 
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But I shall not stop to explain this in more detail, because I 
should deprive you of the pleasure of mastering it yourself, 
as well as of the advantage of training your mind by 
working over it, which is in my opinion the principal benefit 
to be derived from this science. Because, I find nothing here 
so difficult that it cannot be worked out by any one at all 
familiar with ordinary geometry and with algebra, who will 
consider carefully all that is set forth in this treatise (10; see 
also Fauvel 27). 
On the surface, Descartes' intentions seem straightforward enough. He 
appears to be demanding of the reader what any good teacher would 
demand of his or her pupils: that they take active roles in their own 
educations. However, the real goal of this passage is nothing less than a 
carefully-orchestrated act of intimidation. When readers attempt to 
work through the details Descartes has omitted, they find that the 
calculations are extremely difficult, if not impossible. Fauvel notes 
several similar occurrences later in the text-for example, 
I shall not give the constructions for the required tangents 
and normals in connection with the method just explained, 
since it is always easy to find them, although it often 
requires some ingenuity to get short and simple methods of 
construction (Descartes 112; slightly different translation 
qtd in Fauvel 27). 
According to Fauvel, Descartes does g1ve three examples of the 
constructions, but the three he chooses have reasonably simple 
solutions. However, the student would find that applying the method to 
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other curves "landed them in mindboggling or impossible calculations" 
(Fauvel 27). 
When we reexamine the Geometry in this light, we find that 
throughout the text Descartes is not actually nurturing the reader's 
understanding, but rather is doing everything possible to persuade 
readers of their own mathematical incompetence and, consequently, of 
his mathematical genius. Thus Descartes builds credibility for himself 
and for his mathematics by convincing readers that their own abilities 
are inadequate for working through the details that the text omits-
which, of course, they are to assume Descartes has worked through 
himself. 
The evidence that this was Descartes' strategy ts strewn 
throughout the Geometry. He is constantly referring to the ease with 
which he, and other competent mathematicians, can carry out 
procedures. The word "only" in the first sentence of the passage I 
quoted on page 19 ("I have only to join the points ... ") indicates that 
Descartes considers the procedures simple to understand. And in the 
first sentence of the book, we are told that "any problem in geometry 
can easily be reduced to such terms that a knowledge of the lengths of 
certain straight lines is sufficient for its construction" (2). Again the 
words "any" and "easily" in this passage indicate the attitude of the 
Descartes persona toward the material. Such modifiers can be found 
throughout the book whenever Descartes begins to explain something 
new. 
24 
The two passages cited by Fauvel that I provide on page 22 give a 
similar impression: "I find nothing here so difficult that it cannot be 
worked out by any one at all familiar with ordinary geometry and with 
algebra ... ," and "I shall not give the constructions ... since it is always 
easy to find them .... " Descartes clearly wants to create the impression 
that everything he discusses is easy-for those readers with adeptness 
and ingenuity. 
Fauvel also notes passages where Descartes claims weariness and 
the short length of the book for the lack of detail. 
Then later, 
I will try to give the demonstrations in a few words, for I 
am already wearied by so much writing (Descartes 26; see 
also Fauvel 27). 
but if I should stop to demonstrate every theorem I use, it 
would require a much larger volume than I wish to write 
(Descartes 111-112; slightly different translation qtd in 
Fauvel 27). 
Thus, the Descartes persona unquestionably finds the material of the 
Geometry to be elementary, and as one of the wise, finds the lengthy 
explanations required by the young wearisome, in fact bothersome. 
Despite the simplicity of the material for the Descartes persona, he 
warns readers in the "Advertisement" at the beginning of the Geometry 
of the difficulty of the text for the uninitiated. 
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So far I have tried to make my meaning clear to everyone; 
but I doubt that this treatise can be read by anyone not 
familiar with geometry books, for I've thought it 
superfluous to repeat the demonstrations contained in them 
(qtd in Fauvel 26). 
Thus, as Fauvel points out, 
"this essay was to be for initiates, in a way that the 
Discourse and the other two essays were not. The author 
seems to be wishing to establish that most of his readers 
would not be able to understand the final essay" (26). 
Of course what the above analysis suggests is that what Descartes 
actually wanted was for no one to completely understand it. 
Fauvel also suggests a few strategies outside the contents of the 
Geometry that Descartes used to build his reputation. First, the 
Discourse, along with its three appended essays, was published 
anonymously, but of course the authorship was not long kept secret. As 
Fauvel says, Descartes appeared "to prefer the pseudo-mystery of a not-
well-guarded anonymity" (25). Additionally, the book was published in 
French (Fauvel 28). Publishing it in Latin would have made the book 
far more accessible to its audience of European intellectuals, but by 
making much of Europe await a translation, Descartes allowed the 
book's reputation to precede it. Thus he created a sense of anticipation 
to contribute to the air of mystery. Finally, Fauvel notes "a well-known 
story that Aubrey told," in which Descartes is visited by Europe's most 
eminent scholars. When they ask to see the instruments of the great 
Descartes, he pulls out from his drawer a compass with a broken leg and 
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a folded piece of paper used as a straight edge (Fauvel 27). Thus the 
magnitude of Descartes' achievement was to be enhanced in the minds 
of his followers by the crudity of his instruments. 
We can be left with little doubt that Descartes wished his audience 
to consider the Geometry difficult. Fauvel cites two passages written to 
Marin Mersenne to support this. The first was written in 1637, the year 
of publication. 
I do not enjoy speaking in praise of myself, but since few 
people can understand my geometry, and since you wish me 
to give you my opinion of it , I think it is well to say that it 
is all I could hope for ... (qtd in Fauvel 26). 
Then again in 1646, he wrote, 
I have omitted a number of things that might have made La 
Geometrie clearer, but I did this intentionally, and would not 
have it otherwise (qtd in Fauvel 26). 
Clearly Descartes wanted readers to struggle with his book, even though 
he feigned a helpful, nurturing stance. By leaving out difficult or 
impossible steps and telling readers how simple those steps are for the 
adept, he persuaded his audience that they were incapable of fully 
understanding the logic of his argument. It seems likely that Descartes 
recognized weaknesses in his logic, and because logic would not suffice 
to completely persuade his audience, Descartes turned to another of 
Aristotle's elements of rhetoric. He generated an immense ethos that 
would cause readers to blame themselves when they didn't understand 
rather than blaming him. While one can certainly question Descartes' 
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ethics in using this strategy, the strategy was, nevertheless, a 
resounding success-at least until half a century later when Isaac 
Newton encountered it. 
Newton. and Cartesian rhetoric 
Newton's encounter with Cartesian rhetoric is not explicitly 
described by Newton or anyone else that I am aware of. Nevertheless, 
his reaction to it can perhaps be pieced together from the historical and 
textual evidence. Newton's rejection of Cartesian mathematics, which I 
described earlier in this chapter, is well documented, and many of his 
comments and writings suggest the tremendous contempt with which 
he came to view everything Cartesian. 
As Westfall describes it, Newton intensely studied Descartes 
during his undergraduate years at Cambridge. "Notes from Descartes, 
whose works Newton thoroughly digested in a way that he never had 
Aristotle, appear throughout the 'Quaestions'" (89) (the "Quaestions is 
one of Newton's notebooks from his days as a student). As Westfall also 
notes, Newton held Cartesian mathematics in high regard until in or 
around the late 1670s, when he first seriously studied the ancient 
Greeks and then reread the Geometry (377-381). After this time, 
Newton developed an extreme revulsion for Cartesian mathematics, 
calling it "the Analysis of the Bunglers in Mathematics" (qtd in Westfall 
380). What seems likely is that Newton, as a student still unsure of his 
own mathematical abilities, was persuaded during his first study by 
Descartes' efforts to build credibility at . the expense of readers. 
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However, after working through the geometry of the ancients, Newton, 
now confident of his abilities, was no longer persuaded of his own 
inadequacy to handle the mathematics of Descartes. Thus the rhetoric 
of Descartes most likely infuriated Newton when he found himself still 
unable to work through some of the omitted steps. 
While no direct evidence exists to substantiate this supposition, 
Newton did make some highly critical comments about the Geometry 
and wrote at least one manuscript pointing out "errors." According to 
Westfall, when Newton reread the Geometry, 
he went through wntmg in the margins comments such as 
"vix probo" (I hardly approve), "error," and "Non Geom." 
Probably in connection with this reading, he drew up a 
paper of "Errors in Descartes' Geometry (380). 
The paper to which Westfall refers is a short critique, dated m the late 
1670s, where Newton demonstrates that three claims made by 
Descartes in the Geometry are invalid (Whiteside "Papers IV" 336-345). 
All three claims concern Descartes' application of his method to a 
problem done by Pappus, and all three are made within less than two 
pages of text. What is of particular interest is that following the three 
paragraphs in which Descartes makes these claims, and before he 
provides demonstrations to support them, he defends his omission of 
steps. 
I believe that I have in this way completely accomplished 
what Pappus tells us the ancients sought to do, and I will try 
to give the demonstrations in a few words, for I am already 
wearied by so much writing (26). 
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Clearly, Newton was not satisfied with Descartes' demonstrations, and 
quite likely, he was angered by Descartes' excuse for not providing 
more detail. Imagine how Newton must have felt (especially 
considering his emotional constitution). He had recently endured a 
period where his own credibility (in optical studies) had been 
questioned, and now he was discovering that the acknowledged master 
in mathematics, to whom he and the rest of Europe had long been 
devoted, had been less than forthright about the claims he made. Even 
more, he concealed flaws in his logic in a high-handed rhetoric. Surely, 
Descartes must have seemed exceedingly pompous and arrogant to 
Newton considering the rhetorical stance of the Geometry. 
Newton's only other surviving (specific) critique of the Geometry 
further demonstrates the contempt he eventually felt for Descartes and 
the concurrent feelings of respect that he came to have for the ancients. 
According to the editor of Newton's mathematical papers, 
Never one to stomach an overreacher and increasingly in a 
mood to be sharply critical of all things Cartesian, Newton 
soon concluded that in supposing the Greeks not to have 
solved the problem of the 3/4-line locus in all its generality 
Descartes had gone badly wrong (Whiteside, "Papers" 222). 
Later mathematicians conceded the novelty of Descartes' solution 
(Whiteside, "Papers" 221). However, Newton, who was quite likely 
reacting to the arrogance of Cartesian rhetoric, was now becoming 
unwilling to concede to Descartes even his considerable achievements. 
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Euclidean Rhetoric 
Textual evidence clearly indicates that Newton found the 
mathematical presentations of Euclid and the other ancients preferable 
to those of Descartes. Indeed it is becoming increasingly clear that he 
found Euclidean rhetoric in general, mathematical and verbal, 
preferable to the rhetoric of Descartes. Unlike Descartes' rhetoric m the 
Geometry, which regards the mathematics as an invention of the author 
understandable to only the most proficient readers, Euclid's rhetoric 
claims to reveal absolute, Platonic truths with little or no explicit 
acknowledgement of the reader's presence. Even more importantly, 
Euclidean rhetoric provides specific step-by-step details that lead 
readers through a thorough, logical progression from definitions to 
axioms to propositions. So although Euclidean rhetoric doesn't address 
readers directly as Cartesian rhetoric does, it is in fact much more 
reader-friendly. because it endeavors to clarify rather than to confuse. 
Fauvel describes Euclid's rhetoric as "perfectly straightforward: 
there is no sign that he notices the existence of readers at all. Rather, 
he seems engaged in laying down inexorable eternal truths" (25). 
This rhetoric stands in contrast to that of Descartes in the Geometry 
where "the mathematics described is clearly created, not unveiled, in 
rhetoric which veers from grabbing the reader by the lapels to treating 
you (sic) with utter disdain (Fauvel 25). Unlike the rhetoric of 
Descartes, Euclidean rhetoric focuses solely on the text, excluding, as 
much as possible, the presence of both reader and writer. Depending on 
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the translation, the personal pronouns "I" and "we" are occasionally 
used (see Archibald "Euclid's Division of Figures"), and as Fauvel notes, 
the implied "you" of a command is often present: "the nearest Euclid 
seems to get to recognising the existence of readers is in his 'let such-
and-such be done' mode ... " (25). However, the axiomatic presentation 
of Euclid is concerned primarily with the system being described. We 
don't see the long digressions as in the Geometry where Descartes takes 
time to 'chat' with the reader. Euclid has no need to justify his exclusion 
of steps because he doesn't exclude any. 
The fact that Euclid provides each step that one must go through 
m order to follow the logic of his geometry is the vital difference 
between his rhetoric and that of Descartes. Euclid begins by defining 
the basics of geometry (e.g., points, lines, angles). He then takes care to 
postulate a few 'self-evident' assumptions about the manipulation of 
those defined quantities, or axioms (e.g., if two things are both equal to 
a third, they are also equal to each other.) Then using only these most 
basic assumptions, Euclid presents his propositions and proceeds 
logically to demonstrate their validity with detailed step-by-step 
'proofs.' 
Euclid's rhetoric differs substantially from Descartes' in several 
respects. Cartesian rhetoric overtly addresses the audience over and 
over again, while Euclidean rhetoric avoids such references as much as 
possible. Cartesian rhetoric is primarily organized as a narrative, 
whereas Euclidean rhetoric uses formal, numbered propositions 
followed by proofs. But the crucial difference that was likely the most 
32 
important difference for Newton is that Cartesian rhetoric leaves out 
demonstrations of many of its claims, substituting instead the word of 
the author that they can be easily accomplished by the reader. It was 
this final element of Cartesian rhetoric that it seems Newton was 
reacting· most virulently against. However, apparently as a result of this 
reaction (and quite likely other elements as well), Newton rejected the 
whole of Cartesian rhetoric and much of Cartesian philosophy. 
To further substantiate this claim, Chapter II of this thesis will 
take up an analysis of Newtonian rhetoric. Although this analysis will 
focus on the Principia as an example of Euclidean rhetoric, it will also 
examine Newton's "New Theory" article, drawing comparisons between 
Newton's earlier rhetoric and that of Descartes in the Geometry. 
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AN ANALYSIS OF NEWTON'S RHETORIC 
In Shaping Written Knowledge, Bazerman argues that the process 
of answering criticism to the "New Theory" article contributed to 
Newton's development of the Euclidean framework used by both the 
Principia and the Opticks. Newton's writing process therefore 
contributed significantly to the organization and content of his optical 
theory. Although I am arguing that Newton's rejection of Cartesian 
mathematics, mechanics, and rhetoric also contributed to the 
development of this Euclidean organization, I am doubting neither the 
rhetorical character of Newton's process of discovery nor the vital role 
of the optical criticism in that process. 
Analysis in this chapter will demonstrate that the mechanical and 
gravitational theory in the Principia was also largely a product of 
Newton's writing process and his perception of the rhetorical situation. 
The scenario I would paint 1s that answering the optical criticism played 
a part in Newton's decision to look to mathematics for a system of 
argument, but that his later rejection of Cartesian mathematics was 
important for his decision to develop a Euclidean system. Thus, my 
work fills m the gap, both chronologically and rhetorically, between the 
period of optical criticism (1672-1676) described by Bazerman and the 
writing of the Opticks in the 1690s. 
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The "New Theory" Article and Cartesian Rhetoric 
The content and structure of Newton's article, "A New Theory of 
Light and Colours," clearly appears to be the result of Newton's 
perception of the rhetorical situation. The similarity that Bazerman 
demonstrates between Newton's "discovery narrative" and other articles 
in the Transactions during the period and the evidence that he 
provides that Newton reshaped his presentation to conform to that style 
are compelling evidence supporting this assertion. However, the 
discovery narrative is only the first of three distinguishable sections to 
the "New Theory" article. And while the second section is arguably in 
the Transactions style, the third definitely is not. Bazerman suggests no 
model that influenced the content and structure of this third section. 
My analysis, however, will demonstrate that Cartesian rhetoric was 
quite likely an influence on this section, and indeed on the entire article. 
Following the discovery narrative, Newton's article had two other 
distinguishable sections: "an account of the invention of the reflecting 
telescope and a general exposition of the doctrine of colors . " 
(Bazerman 95). The description of the reflecting telescope and its 
invention conform closely to the narrative style used by Transactions 
articles; however, the last section is quite different. It is instead an 
expository list of claims with only occasional references to experimental 
evidence. According to Bazerman, "this last section seems in direct 
contrast with the stated principles and general practice of the journal" 
(96). 
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Bazerman argues, quite convincingly, that Newton was 
summarizing his theory in this third section, omitting much of the 
empirical evidence on which it was based for the sake of conciseness. 
The article was meant to acquaint the scientific community with 
Newton's theory and prepare readers for his forthcoming book. So 
rather than providing all the experimental details, which Newton had in 
fact worked through, the article relied on the experiments it did 
describe as examples of his procedures and on the credibility Newton 
established as a competent observer m the discovery narrative. The 
question Bazerman does not answer is why Newton believed this 
strategy would be successful even though Transactions articles did not 
generally have anything like this third section. The answer to the 
question may be that Descartes had used this same strategy to great 
success, and Newton, at this stage in his career, still retained a great 
deal of respect for Descartes. 
The discovery narrative 
While the Transactions articles of the period were clearly an 
important influence on the composition of Newton's discovery narrative, 
it also seems likely that the first-person narratives used by Descartes in 
Discourse on Method and the Geometry were influences on the rhetoric 
of this section as well. The discovery narrative is a first-person, 
autobiographical narrative in the Cartesian tradition. Take for example, 
the opening paragraph of the "New Theory" article (as published, it is a 
letter addressed to Oldenberg). 
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To perform my late promise to you, I shall without further 
ceremony acquaint you, that in the beginning of the Year 
1666 (at which time I applyed my self to the grinding of 
Optick glasses of other figures than Spherical,) I procured 
me a Triangular glass-Prisme, to try therewith the 
celebrated Phcenomena of Colours. And in order thereto 
having darkened my chamber, and made a small hole in my 
window-shuts, to let in a convenient quantity of the Suns 
light, I placed my Prisme at his entrance, that it might be 
thereby refracted to the opposite wall. It was at first a very 
pleasing divertisement, to view the vivid and intense 
colours produced thereby; but after a while applying my self 
to consider them more circumspectly, I became surprised to 
see them in an oblong form; which, according to the received 
laws of Refraction, I expected should have been circular 
(3075-3076). 
The numerous personal references and the autobiographical scenario 
created by Newton bear a striking resemblance to the narrative of 
Descartes in Discourse on Method. A description of past experience by 
Descartes, very similar in form to the one used by Newton, is provided 
as an example. 
I was then in Germany, whither the occasion of the Wars 
(which are not yet finished) call'd me; and as I return'd from 
the Emperors Coronation on towards the Army, the 
beginning of Winter stopt me in a place, where finding no 
conversation to divert me and on the other sides having by 
good fortune no cares nor passions which troubled me, I 
stayd alone the whole day, shut up in my Stove, where I had 
leisure enough to entertain myself with my thoughts. 
Among which one of the first was that I betook myself to 
consider, That oft times there is not so much perfection in 
works compos'd of divers peeces, and made by the hands of 
several masters, as in those that were wrought by one only: 
("Discourse" 17-18) 
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The similarities between these passages are impossible to ignore. 
Beyond the more superficial similarities in narrative style, both writers 
still have similar strategies-they are each endeavoring to build 
credibility. Newton is trying to establish that he is a competent 
Baconian observer, untainted by the bias of a theoretical disposition; 
and Descartes is attempting to establish himself as well-traveled, well-
connected, and contemplative. Clearly, numerous differences do exist; 
however, these differences are largely the result of the differing goals 
of each discourse and of what each writer perceives as important for 
building credibility. The discovery narrative of Newton is even more 
similar to the Transactions articles of the period, but the similarity with 
the narrative of Descartes' Discourse certainly suggests the possible 
influence of Cartesian rhetoric as well. In fact, it raises the question of 
what influence Cartesian rhetoric had on all of the Transactions articles 
of the late-seventeenth century. 
The doctrine of colours 
While Descartes' influence on Newton's discovery narrative 1s 
debatable, the influence of Cartesian rhetoric on the last section of the 
"New Theory" article is more easily defended-if for no other reason 
than that no other model exists. As noted before, Bazerman states that 
Newton's exposition of his doctrine is written contrary to the practices 
of other Transactions articles of the period. However, that exposition 
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does resemble to a remarkable extent the rhetoric of Descartes m the 
Geometry. 
The most important similarities between Cartesian rhetoric and 
the Newtonian rhetoric of the "New Theory" article are deletion of 
evidence and accompanying attempts to build credibility which 
persuade readers that the evidence exists. The most important 
differences are (1) Newton's evidence really existed as he claimed, 
whereas Descartes' occasionally did not, and (2) Newton's attempts to 
build credibility were directed only at establishing his own competence, 
whereas Descartes' were directed at establishing his own superiority 
and the reader's incompetence. Despite the honesty in Newton's claims 
and the subterfuge in those of Descartes, Newton did borrow a great 
deal from Cartesian rhetoric. Of course, at this time Newton was 
unaware of Descartes' dishonesty. 
Newton's shift from the second to the third section of his article 1s 
marked most notably by a shift from a narrative to an instructional 
mode, much the same as Descartes' shift in the Geometry. 
I shall now proceed to acquaint you with another more 
notable difformity in [the reflecting telescope's] Rays, 
wherein the Origin of Colours is unfolded: Concerning which 
I shall lay down the Doctrine first, and then, for its 
examination, give you an instance or two of the Experiments, 
as a specimen of the rest (Newton 3081). 
For one of the first times in the article, Newton is usmg the pronoun 
"you." Prior to this section, "I" has been the only pronoun used almost 
without exception, whereas in the third section, "you" is much more 
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common [although, as Bazerman notes, the shift is primarily from "first 
person active to third object existential" (96)]. In this passage, Newton 
is also warning readers that the evidence he will provide for his 
"doctrine" is to be taken as illustratory only, and not as the sum-total of 
evidence for his theory. 
Later in the section, Newton again refers to the omission of 
experimental evidence. More than any other passage in the article, this 
statement shows the influence of Cartesian rhetoric on Newton. 
Reviewing what I have written, I see the discourse it self 
will lead to divers Experiments sufficient for its 
examination: And therefore I shall not trouble you further, 
than to describe one of those, which I have already 
insinuated (Newton 3085). 
The influence of Descartes' statements that encourage readers to work 
through omitted demonstrations for their own benefits and that claim a 
desire for conciseness as reasons for his omissions can clearly be seen in 
this passage. Newton is not lecturing to pupils as did the Descartes 
persona, but rather he is enjoining equals to make the discoveries for 
themselves, so his statement reflects this difference in the relationship 
between writer and audience. However, in a fashion very similar to 
Descartes, Newton doesn't want to burden his text with thorough 
demonstrations of all his claims. 
Finally, near the end of the article, Newton makes a statement 
very similar to the disclaimer of Descartes where he welcomes criticism 
of his work. 
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This, I conceive, is enough for an Introduction to 
Experiments of this kind; which if any of the R. Society shall 
be so curious as to prosecute, I should be very glad to be 
informed with what success: That if any thing seem to be 
defective, or to thwart this relation, I may have an 
opportunity of giving further direction about it, or of 
acknowledging my errors, if I have committed any. 
Considering Newton's reaction to the criticism he did receive, it seems 
that like Descartes his desire for criticism was perhaps not genuine, but 
was instead intended to demonstrate his reasonableness. But of course 
Newton regarded the criticism he did receive as unfounded and due to 
the inability of his critics to experiment carefully, rather being due to 
errors on his part. 
It seems likely that Newton was led to believe that his doctrine 
would be accepted because of the acceptance, and indeed the 
tremendous stature, of Descartes in Europe during the seventeenth 
century. Certainly the discovery narrative was patterned after the 
Transactions articles of the period in an attempt to build credibility for 
the doctrine of colours. But it seems likely that the factor that caused 
Newton to believe such a strategy would be persuasive was the success 
of that strategy for Descartes. 
It is not necessary to assume that Newton consciously modeled his 
rhetoric after that of Descartes. Bazerman notes that "since Newton had 
taken notes on and summarized a number of [Transactions] articles, 
imitating that model need not have been a highly reflective act" (91). 
Similarly, the rhetoric of Descartes could have made its impact on 
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Newton due simply to his close study of and great respect for the 
mathematician during this period of his career. 
The Principia and Newton's New Rhetorical Strategy 
As a result of the period of criticism following the "New Theory" 
article and as a result of the subsequent contempt he developed for 
Cartesian rhetoric, and Descartes in general, Newton radically altered his 
rhetorical strategies. By the time he completed the Principia in 1687, 
Newton had created a radically new rhetoric based on the Euclidean 
system of mathematical argumentation, for which he had by now 
developed an immense amount of respect. This new rhetorical strategy 
would characterize Newton's work for the rest of his life and would 
make a major contribution to his contemporary success and his 
historical legacy. 
The Principia is divided into three volumes. The first two, "De 
Motu Corporum" ("On the Motion of Bodies") are a series of 
mathematical propositions and demonstrations where Newton uses his 
newly developed calculus to demonstrate the mechanical principles of a 
hypothetical universe where forces can operate upon objects at a 
distance-in cases where there is no resisting medium ("Liber Primus") 
and in cases where there is one ("Liber Secundus"). He then uses Book 
III to argue that our universe obeys those principles. Book III, "De 
Munde Systemate" ("System of the World") is thus the heart of Newton's 
'natural philosophy,' where he uses observed "phenomena" to 
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demonstrate that the motions of bodies 10 our world are described by 
the mechanical principles of books I and II. 
It should be no surprise by now that the organizational 
framework of the Principia resembles that of Euclid's Elements of 
Geometry (as well as those of his other works). Just as does Euclid, 
Newton starts by defining a few quantities he recognizes as existing m 
the universe. From these definitions, Newton proposes three axioms, or 
laws of nature, that describe the interaction of the defined quantities. 
Following the definitions and axioms (and some corollaries and scholia 
used to illustrate them), are Newton's two books (368 pages) of 
mathematical propositions along with their accompanying geometrical 
theorems. Using these definitions, axioms, and mathematical results, 
Newton creates, in Book III, an argument for the validity of his 
propositions that he believes cannot be questioned. Unlike in the "New 
Theory" article, Newton now provides every detail of experimental 
evidence. And he organizes his claims and evidence (propositions and 
theorems) so that each claim can be justified with evidence as it is 
encountered. Thus, once the definitions and axioms are accepted as 
factual, the logical progression of steps is designed to lead one 
inevitably to each succeeding proposition. As Bazerman notes for the 
Opticks, this closed, logical system leaves no room for interpretation. 
Once the system is accepted, logical rigor reduces to error any 
conclusions contrary to those of Newton. 
Euclid was working in the abstract realm of mathematics; thus not 
surprisingly, Newton's first two books are nearly identical (in form, if 
43 
not in content) to the Elements. However, where physics departs from 
mathematics, Newton departs from Euclid. The third book of the 
Principia, although still very similar in form to the Elements, adds an 
additional element-empirical evidence. Before Newton states a single 
proposition, he lists a series of six observed "Phenomena," the goal of 
which is to demonstrate experimentally that the orbits of the various 
planets and their satellites are elliptical. In addition, the axioms of 
Newton are also based on his observation of nature and justified by 
appealing to readers' experiences within the physical world, whereas 
Euclid regarded his axioms as "self-evident" to any logical, thinking 
person. 
After demonstrating empirically that the known planetary objects 
revolve in elliptical orbits (Phenomena 1-VI), Newton demonstrates 
mathematically that an inverse-square force-one which decreases as 
the square of distance-directed at the center of those objects results in 
elliptical orbits for their satellites (Propositions I- Ill); he then claims 
that gravity is in fact that same inverse-square force. Propositions IV 
and V make this claim for the earth-moon system, for the other 
planetary systems, and for the sun-planets system. Proposition VI 
claims that gravity is a property of planets in general and that its 
magnitude depends on a given planet's mass. Finally, Proposition VII 
states that gravity is a property of objects in general and dependent on 
their masses: 
That there is a property of gravity pertammg to all bodies, 
proportional to the several quantities of matter which they 
contain (414 ). 
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This 'Universal Law of Gravitation' is essentially the thesis of Newton's 
argument. The only further evidence Newton requires to demonstrate it 
is the already well-known empirical result that gravity is an inverse-
square force and the (also previously known) magnitude of that force at 
a given distance from the earth's center. Thus seventeen pages into 
Book III, Newton explicitly states the thesis of the entire work. The rest 
of the book (another 133 pages) is devoted to further illustrating the 
validity of that thesis-for example, showing how gravity controls the 
motions of comets and the ocean's tides. 
Deductive and inductive structure in the Princivia 
The primarily deductive organization that Bazerman describes for 
the Opticks is clearly apparent in the Principia as well; however, the 
step-by-step basing of propositions on previously stated results in the 
Principia (and in the Opticks) also takes advantage of what is best about 
an inductive organization-namely, it doesn't ask readers to make logical 
leaps of faith. The most important deductive characteristic of the 
Principia is the early statement of its thesis. As I noted above, the 
thesis of the Principia is stated early in the third book. Although it ts 
over four hundred pages into the work as a whole, the thesis is very 
early m the text as Newton intended it to be read. Newton makes it 
clear m his introduction to Book III that the first two books are not to 
be read thoroughly, but rather, are to be used as references when 
needed. 
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... I chose to reduce the substance of this Book into the 
form of Propositions (in the mathematical way), which 
should be read by those only who had first made 
themselves masters of the principles established in the 
preceding Books: not that I would advise anyone to the 
previous study of every Proposition of those Books; for they 
abound with such as might cost too much time, even to 
readers of good mathematical learning. It is enough if one 
carefully reads the Definitions, the Laws of Motion [the 
axioms], and the first three sections of the first Book. He 
may then pass on to this Book, and consult such of the 
remammg Propositions of the first two Books, as the 
references in this, and his occasions, shall require (397). 
So as the text is meant to be read, we first learn what Newton is up to 
less than twenty pages into his argument since most of the first two 
books are for reference only and the "first three sections of the first 
Book" are basically a mathematics lesson in Newton's calculus and some 
of the mechanical principles derived therefrom. 
Interestingly enough, however, the organization does have many 
inductive characteristics. As Bazerman notes (and as I will discuss 
shortly), Newton became obsessed with pinning down every detail of 
his argument, apparently out of an intense desire to avoid criticism (and 
as I have argued, out of his desire to avoid the rhetorical practices of 
Descartes). Thus Newton was unwilling to make any claims for which 
he had not already provided evidence-evidence to which he would 
refer in the proposition's theorem. Thus definitions, axioms, 
mathematical results, empirical results, and any propositions on which a 
given proposition depends come before the proposition. Newton did 
take advantage of the deductive (claims preceding evidence) structure 
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for each individual proposition, but the Euclidean format alerts readers 
to expect evidence for a given proposition to immediately follow in the 
theorem. 
Still with the thesis stated so early in the book (as it is meant to 
be read), the overall organization appears to retain a largely deductive 
character. But with further analysis, we find that Newton has already 
made the bulk of his argument in the six propositions preceding the 
thesis (Proposition VII)-an argument that incidentally relies heavily on 
inductive reasoning. As I described it above on pages 42 and 43, 
Newton's argument is essentially made by demonstrating that gravity 
controls all the planetary motions, and by asking readers to extend 
what he has shown them about planets to objects in general. He even 
provides instruction for those who don't concede the validity of 
inductive reasoning at the third book's beginning (see "Rules for 
Reasoning in Philosophy" (398)). So Newton has it both ways. He is 
able to state his central claim early in the text, yet he has already 
blunted most criticism by providing very persuasive evidence before its 
statement. The rest of the text provides further evidence for the 
universality of gravity, but few would doubt the claim after working 
through Theorem VII. 
Thus it appears that Newton learned valuable lessons from 
answering his critics and from his rejection of Descartes. He learned the 
value of stating one's most important claims early in a discourse to 
allow readers to better understand the relevance of the evidence that 
follows. And perhaps even more importantly, he learned the 
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importance of providing detailed evidence to support each claim. Even 
more than this though, adapting the structure created by Euclid to his 
own needs, Newton proceeded from a few assumptions about the 
mechanical operation of the universe ("Definitions" and "Axioms"), some 
observational evidence ("Phenomena"), and some assumptions about 
how science should be conducted ("Rules for Reasoning in Philosophy") 
to create a logically interconnected, "closed" system of claims that 
cannot be questioned from within the system. After readers accept 
Newton's assumptions and empirical evidence, they are logically 
compelled to accept his propositions. Interestingly, Newton seems to 
have recognized the weakest points in his theory. In the first edition of 
the Principia, he termed the "Rules for Reasoning in Philosophy" and the 
"Phenomena" as "Hypotheses" instead. However, in later editions he 
altered the titles, recognizing the persuasive value of the more concrete, 
factual names and quite likely the more accurate descriptions that the 
later titles provided. 
Analytic ar2ument and its accompanyin2 scholia 
The step-by-step, closed (what I will call 'analytic') argument 
used by Newton in the Principia and the Opticks stands in direct 
contrast to the rhetoric of Descartes in the Geometry and to the rhetoric 
of the "New Theory" article. To my knowledge, no one but Newton has 
ever used Euclid's system of definitions, axioms, and propositions as an 
organizational scheme for anything but mathematics. Quite likely this is 
due to the nearly unreadable result that system produces. The 
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multitude of references in Book III of the Principia to the mathematical 
demonstrations of (primarily) the first book, to the "Phenomena," and to 
previous "Propositions" make the text unbearably tedious and difficult 
to follow. It is only when one considers Newton's extreme concern 
about criticism, his revulsion for Cartesian rhetoric, and the magnitude 
of what Newton accomplished that the difficulty of his text becomes 
more understandable. 
The exceeding tediousness of Newton's analytic argument can be 
seen in Proposition III and its accompanying theorem. The phenomena 
that Newton refers to are the five empirical results concerning the 
planets and their moons that immediately precede the propositions of 
Book III, and the propositions and corollaries referred to are 
mathematical results from Book I. 
That the force by which the moon is retained in its orbit 
tends to the earth; and is inversely as the square of the 
distance of its place from the earth's centre. 
The former part of the Proposition is evident from Phen. VI, 
and Prop. II or III, Book I; the latter from the very slow 
motion of the moon's apogee; which in every single 
revolution amounting but to 3° 3' forwards, may be 
neglected. For (by Cor. I, Prop. XLV, Book I) it appears, that, 
if the distance of the moon from the earth's centre is to the 
semidiameter of the earth as D to I, the force, from which 
such a motion will result, is inversely as D2 4/243 ... 
The labor involved in following long tracts of such prose, replete with 
references to previous results that force the reader to flip through 
previous pages of the book to understand the argument, is too much for 
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most readers. Not all of Newton's propositions were so dependent on 
previous results; still few readers have had the patience, the fortitude, 
or the ability (remember his geometric demonstrations are nearly 
impossible to follow as well) to understand his analytic argument. 
Nevertheless, the direct relationships Newton meticulously established 
between propositions and evidence made it possible for him to accuse 
any who accepted his basic assumptions and yet not his propositions as 
either an uncareful reader or as mathematically incompetent. 
Newton was, in fact, well aware of the unreadability of his closed, 
analytic text and therefore illustrated his propositions with abundant 
scholia in order to make his propositions more easily understandable to 
readers and in order to further elaborate on issues that the analytical 
argument does not directly address. In the introduction to Book III, 
Newton explains the relationship of the scholia to the "principles" 
expounded upon in his analytic text. 
These principles are the laws and conditions of certain 
motions, and powers or forces, which chiefly have respect to 
philosophy; but, lest they should have appeared of 
themselves dry and barren, I have illustrated them here 
and there with some philosophical scholiums, giving an 
account of such things as are of more general nature, and 
which philosophy seems chiefly founded on; such as the 
density and resistance of bodies, spaces void of all bodies, 
and the motion of light and sounds. 
So although Newton regarded the step-by-step, analytical argument to 
be the significant breakthrough and the real substance of his argument, 
he also recognized the value of explaining the implications of his 
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analysis usmg tangible examples that make those implications more 
easily understood. 
A good example of Newton's use of his scholia to illustrate his 
analytical argument follows Proposition and Theorem IV. The 
proposition and my condensed version of the theorem are shown on the 
following page. Although even my condensed version of the theorem is 
rather lengthy, it is important to gain some understanding of Newton's 
argument in order to contrast it with his illustration in the scholium. 
That the moon gravitates toward the earth, and by the force 
of gravity is continually drawn off from a rectilinear motion, 
and retained in its orbit 
The mean distance of the moon from the earth ... [is] 
123249600 Paris feet, as the French have found by 
mensuration. And now if we imagine the moon, deprived of 
all motion, to be let go, so as to descend towards the earth 
with the impulse of all that force by which (by Cor., Prop. 
III) it is retained in its orb, it will in the space of one minute 
of time, describe its fall 151112 Paris feet. This we gather by 
a calculus, founded either upon Prop. XXXVI, Book I, or (which 
comes to the same thing upon Cor. IX, Prop. IV, of the same 
Book ... Wherefore, since that force, in approaching to the 
earth, increases in the proportion of the inverse square of 
the distance, and, upon that account, at the surface of the 
earth, is 60 · 60 times greater than at the moon, a body in 
our regions, falling with that force ought to describe 60 · 60 · 
151112 Paris feet; and in the space of one second of time, to 
describe 151/12 of those feet. ... [We also find from a 
pendulum experiment performed by Huygens that bodies on 
earth fall at 151/12 Paris feet per second;] ... therefore the 
force by which the moon is retained in its orbit becomes, at 
the very surface of the earth, equal to the force of gravity 
which we observe in heavy bodies there. And therefore (by 
Rule I and 2) the force by which the moon is retained in its 
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orbit is that very same force which we commonly call 
gravity; for, were gravity another force different from that, 
then bodies descending to the earth with the joint impulse 
of both forces would fall with a double velocity, and in the 
space of one second of time would describe 30116 Paris feet; 
altogether against experience ( 407 -408). 
Newton's argument then is: since the force controlling celestial motion 
and gravity have the same magnitude at the earth's surface (facts that 
he demonstrates empirically and mathematically), and since only one 
force is observed, then the two forces must in fact be the same one. 
This argument seems straightforward enough to the modern mind, 
even though following the direction of Newton's analytical argument is 
somewhat difficult. But Newton was faced with an audience who 
questioned whether physical principles valid on Earth could be 
extended to the heavens. Thus he needed a tangible example that 
would make that extension easier for his readers to accept. What he 
used in the scholium to accomplish this goal is what modern science 
would call a 'thought experiment.' 
The demonstration of this Proposition may be more 
diffusely explained after the following manner. Suppose 
several moons to revolve about the earth, as in the system 
of Jupiter or Saturn .... Now if the lowest of these were 
very small, and were so near the earth as almost to touch 
the top of the highest mountains, the centripetal force 
thereof, retaining it in its orbit, would be nearly equal to the 
weights of any terrestrial bodies that should be found upon 
the tops of those mountains . . . . Therefore if the same little 
moon should be deserted by its centrifugal force that carries 
it through the orbit, and be disabled from going onward 
therein, it would descend to the earth; and that with the 
same velocity, with which heavy bodies actually fall upon 
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the tops of those very mountains, because of the equality of 
the forces that oblige them both to descend. [And if the 
centripetal force were different from gravity, the moon 
would fall at twice the rate we observe because of the 
influence of both forces.]. . . And therefore the force which 
retains the moon in it orbit is that very force which we 
commonly call gravity ... (409). 
The rhetorical value of this 'thought experiment' is that it creates a 
plausible, easily-comprehended scenario that helps readers to overcome 
their prejudices about the difference between the heavens and the 
earth. The scenario helps readers to extend what they already 
intuitively understand about the motions of objects on the earth to the 
motions of objects in space. It makes the logic of Newton's argument 
easily understandable. If readers want the details of the evidence 
Newton uses to support his conclusion, they can refer to the theorem, 
but to get the 'big picture' of his argument in a form they can easily 
understand, readers need only refer to the scholium. Considering the 
rhetorical effect of the titles he used (theorem versus scholium) and the 
concern he had for providing every detail, Newton obviously considered 
the analytical arguments in the theorems to be the vital elements of his 
theory. However, considering the difficulty of those analytical 
arguments, contemporary readers were probably often content with 
reading the scholia. 
Although Newton primarily uses the scholia to clarify and 
simplify, he also uses them to anticipate (and answer) potential 
objections readers might have to any of his assumptions. The 
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scholium following the "Definitions" at the beginning of the work is one 
such example. Newton's definitions all assume an absolute space, time, 
and motion-notions which seventeenth-century thought had yet to 
completely accept. Thus Newton apparently felt it important to define 
and justify his assumptions philosophically. 
Hitherto I have laid down the definitions of such words as 
are less known, and explained the sense in which I would 
have them understood in the following discourse. I do not 
define time, space, place, and motion, as being well known to 
all. Only I must observe, that the common people conceive 
those quantities under no other notions but from the 
relation they bear to sensible objects. And thence arise 
certain prejudices, for the removing of which it will be 
convenient to distinguish them into absolute and relative, 
true and apparent, mathematical and common ... (6). 
Newton then follows with seven pages that define and argue for the 
existence of these absolute concepts. It is clear from the above passage 
and from the placement of these definitions and justifications in the 
scholium that Newton regarded the concepts of absolute time, space, 
and motion as obvious assumptions. However, it is also clear that he 
recognized that those assumptions might be questioned. Thus, the 
rhetorical strategy behind the scholium is similar to that of the others. 
It solidifies and clarifies Newton's position. Again, as with the rest of 
the theory, Newton is trying to account for every detail, every possible 
objection to his claims. 
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Euclidean format and the "System of the World" 
Newton's motivation for looking to mathematics, m particular 
Greek mathematics, for a system of argument is not completely certain; 
however, several possibilities do exist. Quite likely Newton's motivation 
was some combination of all of them. First of all, Bazerman argues for 
the Opticks, and I agree for the Principia, that Newton wanted a system 
that would present his theories as he perceived them-as concrete fact. 
Thus in looking to mathematical forms of argument, in particular 
Euclidean argument, Newton avoided as much as possible the 'slippery' 
nature of words. Although Newton had no hope of actually reducing his 
theories to purely mathematical relationships, his use of the 
mathematical designations: "definition," "axiom," "propositi on," 
"theorem," "lemma," "corollary," and "problem" to organize even the 
primarily non-mathematical parts of his theories had the rhetorical 
effect of creating a mathematical precision and certainty of which words 
are incapable. 
In addition, the Principia was primarily an achievement in 
mathematics and mathematical physics. The notion that gravity 
controls the motions of the planets was not a new idea; it was only the 
mathematics of Books I and II that allowed Newton to be the first to 
demonstrate it to the world. Thus Newton, in his introduction to Book 
III, makes it quite clear that the chief value of the work is 
mathematical. 
In the preceding books I have laid down the principles of 
philosophy; principles not philosophical but mathematical: 
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such, namely, as we may build our reasonings upon in 
philosophical inquiries. . . ("Principles" 397). 
Without the mathematical demonstrations of the first two books, the 
propositions of Book III about the mechanics of our solar system are, 
for Newton, "hypotheses." And remember that Newton, unlike 
Descartes, wanted every detail of his argument pinned down. He 
wanted a 'synthetic' meshing of the various elements of his theory like 
those of the ancient Greeks. Thus it was vitally important that the 
relationships between the 'natural philosophy' of Book III and 
mathematical principles of the first two books be made as explicit as 
possible. 
The decision to make the ties between Book III and Books I and II 
explicit by extending the mathematical format to Book III was in fact a 
conscious decision on the part of Newton. In an early draft, the 
Principia was envisioned as two books: "De Motu Corporum" and "De 
Munde Systemate." The first book was composed of the mathematical 
treatises of what eventually would be Books I and II. As it grew in 
length, Newton divided this original "De Motu" into two books along 
what he eventually saw as a natural division (motion without a 
resistant medium and motion with one). However, the original Book II, 
"De Munde Systemate," was written as an essay, rather than in the 
Euclidean style (Westfall 420-434). And while the justification for 
Newton's "System" was always "De Motu," the relationships between the 
original two books were not made explicitly, as they were in the 
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Principia. Continuing in the introduction to Book III of the Principia, 
Newton states: 
... I now demonstrate the frame of the System of the World. 
Upon this subject I had, indeed, composed the third Book m 
a popular method, that it might be read by many; but 
afterwards, considering that such as had not sufficiently 
entered into the principles could not easily discern the 
strength of the consequences, nor lay aside the prejudices to 
which they had been many years accustomed, therefore, to 
prevent the disputes which might be raised upon such 
accounts, I chose to reduce the substance of this Book into 
the form of Propositions (in the mathematical way), which 
should be read by those only who had first made 
themselves masters of the principles established in the 
preceding Books ... ("Principles" 397). 
Clearly, Newton was not satisfied with the essay form of his "System." 
As Newton stated, he realized that just as with the "New Theory" article, 
readers would not be able to see the implications of his mathematical 
demonstrations for celestial mechanics unless he made the logical 
connections for them. So what Newton wanted for his mathematics (a 
'synthetic' formulation), he also wanted for his entire theory. He 
wanted a closed, interwoven, mutually-supporting network of 
propositions and demonstrations-a synthetic genre. 
What Newton was really talking about was his new standard for 
evidence. The original "System" relied not so much on the mechanical 
principles demonstrated mathematically by Newton for evidence, but 
rather on creating plausible scenarios based on the common experience 
of readers and writer. While the actual justification was, to Newton's 
mind, the mathematics of "De Motu," the original "System" persuaded by 
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generalizing from experiences that readers were commonly familiar 
with rather than explicitly referring to mechanical principles 
established in "De Motu." Thus, the original "System" was very similar 
to the scholia of the Principia. 
Actually, the arguments of the original "System," are more than 
similar to those in the scholia. It appears that the arguments made in 
the scholia are at times revised versions of those made in the "System." 
Fortunately, we can compare the two because copies of the original "De 
Motu" and "De Munde Systemate" were deposited by Newton in 
Cambridge library. As an obligation of his chair as Lucasian Professor of 
Mathematics at Cambridge, Newton was required to deposit with the 
University Library revised and polished versions of his lectures. 
However, the two texts Newton deposited are regarded by historians as 
the early drafts of the Principia, rather than actual records of his 
lectures (Cohen "System" vii; Westfall 423 ). 
By examining the text of the original "System" and comparing it to 
the text of the Principia, we can see that some of Newton's scholia are m 
fact revisions of the original essay. For instance, Newton's scholium 
explaining the effect of gravity on the motion of the moon uses not only 
a similar rhetorical strategy (a thought experiment), but a very similar 
argument as the following passage from the original "System." 
That by the means of centripetal forces, the Planets may 
be retained in certain orbits, we may easily understand, if 
we consider the motions of projectiles. . . . 
Let AFB represent the surface of the Earth, [see Newton's 
diagram (my Figure 1) on the following page] C its center, 
VD, VE, VF, the curve lines which a body [he mentions a 
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stone in the previous paragraph] would describe, if 
projected in an horizontal direction from the top of a high 
mountain, successively with more and more velocity .... 
And for the same reason that the body projected with a less 
velocity, describes the lesser arc VD, and with a greater 
velocity, the greater arc VE, and augmenting the velocity, it 
goes farther and farther to F and G; if the velocity was still 
more and more augmented, it would reach at last quite 
beyond the circumference of the Earth, and return to the 
mountain from which it was projected .... 
But if we now imagine bodies to be projected in the 
directions of lines parallel to the horizon from greater 
heights, as of 5, 10, 100, 1000 or more miles, or rather as 
many semi-diameters of the Earth; those bodies according to 
their different velocity, and the different force of gravity at 
different heights, will describe arcs either concentric with 
the Earth, or variously eccentric, and go on revolving 
through the heavens in those trajectories, just as the Planets 
do in their orbs (5-7). 
Newton noted in my deletions that the velocity would remain constant 
due to Kepler' second law and the fact that he (Newton) was assuming 
no air resistance. 
Figure 1. Newton's figure illustrating a projectile thrown 
from a mountain top ("System" 6) 
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Note in this passage how Newton apparently revised it to create 
the argument in the scholium that I cited on pages 51 and 52. Newton 
retained the idea of an object orbiting at the mountain tops and how 
that could be extended to satellites orbiting in space. This was 
apparently, as I noted earlier, because Newton wanted readers to accept 
that the mechanics of terrestrial objects are the same as the mechanics 
of those in space. Interestingly, however, Newton discarded the notion 
of a stone thrown from a mountain top, preferring instead to use a 
"very small" moon. He probably decided his readers understood that 
the force controlling a planet's satellites emanated from the planet's 
center; and thus, they did not need the analogy between projectiles and 
satellites. But it seems to me that retaining the analogy would have 
been a very effective tool for persuading readers that mechanics, 
celestial and terrestrial, are the same. Perhaps this is yet more 
evidence that Newton expected the reader to be persuaded by the 
analytical argument and that the scholium was primarily for 
clarification. 
This thought experiment used by Newton in the original "System" 
and then revised and used as one of his scholia is clearly different from 
the analytic text of the Principia. Actually, it resembles in at least two 
respects the texts of the Geometry and the "New Theory" article. First, 
the thought experiment, in both cases, is a narrative. Newton asks the 
reader to imagine; he tells a story about what would happen if certain 
events were to occur. Second, Newton uses one, or only a few, examples 
to illustrate a general law, much the same as did both the Geometry and 
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the "New Theory" article. Thus it seems clear that in rejecting this 
format for his "System," Newton was again demonstrating his 
dissatisfaction with Cartesian organization and standards for evidence. 
But while he clearly rejected the Cartesian style for proving his 
conclusions, Newton still found it useful for making the logic of those 
conclusions easily understood. In this way, Newton anticipated (and 
perhaps created a model for) the practices of future scientists. Today, 
just as did Newton, scientists rely on thought experiments to illustrate 
their conclusions, not to prove them. 
Conclusions 
The preceding analysis clearly demonstrates that Newton 
considered his Euclidean, analytic, closed system (or mode) of argument 
to be the primary persuasive force in the Principia. While the scholia 
occasionally explained some of his assumptions and often clarified and 
illustrated the . analytic argument, they were, as their name implies, 
inessential to the chain of reasoning. Newton developed this Euclidean, 
analytic mode as a response to both the inadequacy he perceived in the 
"New Theory" article and the contempt he developed for the Cartesian 
mode found in the Geometry. 
Newton chose Euclidean mathematical argument as a model for 
primarily three reasons. (1) The tone of the Euclidean presentation 
matched Newton's epistemological view of his theory; it regarded the 
theory as concrete fact. (2) The Euclidean step-by-step system of 
directly, and explicitly, connecting every claim to supporting evidence 
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was a much more persuasive mode of argument for Newton's audience 
than the practice of providing only examples of the evidence and 
relying on writer credibility to persuade where evidence was missing. 
And (3) the great respect Newton developed for the mathematics of the 
ancients as a mode of presentation (and the concurrent revulsion he 
developed for the mathematics of Descartes) led him to model the 
ancients wherever possible. The last two of these reasons are of course 
mutually supporting; in fact it makes even more sense that Newton's 
revulsion for Cartesian rhetoric (and preference for Euclidean) is what 
caused his preference for the geometrical representations of the 
ancients. 
To what relative degrees each of these factors were influences on 
Newton's rhetoric is only marginally important; they were m fact all 
influences. What is important is that the resulting mode of argument 
was exceedingly persuasive and was an important influence on 
following generations because of the closed framework that linked 
mutually-supporting propositions and evidence, and because even 
within this framework, Newton was still able to maintain a primarily 
deductive organization. As Bazerman notes, science would eventually 
develop communal closed systems through such practices as the citation 
of other people's contributions. Also, scientists would eventually learn 
to combine rigorous logical and mathematical demonstrations with 
explanatory material such as that found in Newton's scholia (largely 
because they don't attempt such monumental works). Thus many of the 
difficulties in Newton's presentation were overcome. Nevertheless, the 
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essential elements of content and organization that Newton established 
in the Principia, and continued in the Opticks, have remained with 
scientific writing to the present day. 
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APPENDIX: CREATIVE PERIODS IN THE LIFE OF NEWTON 
For better understanding the relationship between Newton's 
optical writing and his writing on celestial mechanics and gravity in the 
Principia, it is useful to examine chronological stages in his thinking 
process. Keeping track of the large number of dates involved in this 
task and understanding their relevance can be a daunting task. I have 
therefore provided a time line on the next page (Figure 2) to facilitate 
the following discussion. The goal of the discussion is to establish that 
Newton had temporarily abandoned his work on optics before taking up 
serious study of celestial mechanics, and that it was only after the 
publication of the Principia that Newton returned to the writing of the 
Opticks. Such evidence lends support to my assertion that Newton's 
final decision to use a Euclidean organization was closely associated with 
the writing of the Principia. 
The influence of the Principia on the Opticks is far from simple to 
establish; much easier to establish, considering Bazerman's work, is that 
the early optical writings influenced the Principia. And because of a 
tragic event in the life of Newton, a destructive fire in his Cambridge 
office, we will probably never be able to trace exactly the trail of the 
influences these two texts had upon each other. However, it is also 
because of this fire, and maybe Newton's generally reclusive attitude 
during this period, that the Opticks was not Newton's first published 
book. Thus, the fire is also the event that made it possible for the 
Principia to influence the Opticks, and it is possible that Book I of the 
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Opticks would not have been the "logical and empirical juggernaut" that 
Bazerman describes had the manuscript not been destroyed (121). 
Optics 
The fire to which I have been referring apparently occurred 
during the winter of 1677/1678, and it destroyed a nearly complete 
book-length manuscript of Newton's optical theory. Following the 
period of controversy surrounding the "New Theory" article (ending m 
1676), Newton, spurred on by answering his critics, nearly completed 
his optical theory by late 1677. Then apparently in December 1677 or 
early 1678 a catastrophic fire in Newton's office destroyed the 
manuscript, and along with it, Newton's motivation to continue his study 
of optics (Bazerman 119; Westfall 276-279). 
Richard Westfall, in his authoritative biography of Newton, 
confirms that most of the work on the optical manuscript occurred 
during 1677. Newton's correspondence about optics continued into 
mid-1678, but most of it appears to have been futile attempts to 
recover some of his lost work from his correspondents (Westfall 276-
280). Westfall also notes "a hiatus in Newton's correspondence from 18 
December to February ... " (278) that might indicate a period of 
depression following the monumental loss. Thus, Newton's initial period 
of optical writing was clearly over by early 1678. Newton did not 
produce another draft of his optical theory until circa 1690, and he 
didn't publish the Opticks until 1704 (Bazerman 84 ). 
69 
Celestial Mechanics 
Although Newton abandoned his optical theory for over a decade 
following the fire in his office, within the next few years, he began a 
correspondence about celestial mechanics with Robert Hooke, Edmund 
Halley, Christian Huygens, and others that would lead eventually to the 
Principia. Newton had long had an interest in planetary motion and, 
along with his correspondents, had long suspected that gravity 
controlled that motion. In fact, his first thoughts on the role of gravity 
in planetary motion apparently occurred in 1666 (Westfall 143). 
However, he soon put aside his thoughts on the subject and 
concentrated on optics, mathematics, and other interests. One theory 
advanced is that he did so because an inaccurate figure for the earth's 
radius caused him to believe his ideas were misguided (Brewster 290; 
Whiteside, "Manuscripts" ). Another suggestion is that it was simply 
because of an overriding interest in optics (Herivel 14). However, 
Westfall believes that Newton lost interest because he had not yet 
worked out his mechanics (laboring still under Descartes' 'Theory of 
Vortices') and thus could not explain the effect of gravity to his own 
satisfaction (155). Whatever the reason, scholars agree that Newton 
didn't regain his interest in celestial mechanics until the early 1670s, 
when he published a few minor results in the Transactions, and that no 
serious breakthroughs occurred until 1679. (Brewster 291-292; Herivel 
14; Westfall 377). 
The series of events that is generally thought to have rekindled 
Newton's interest in celestial mechanics is Robert Hooke's attempts in 
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late 1679 to open a correspondence with Newton concermng the forces 
causing planetary motion (Brewster 291-292; Westfall 382; Herivel 14). 
However, Newton did not himself perhaps realize his interest until 
much later (around 1684). Hooke was clearly beginning to discard the 
accepted notion that each planet has its own unique force controlling its 
motion; he also introduced an understanding of circular motion that up 
to then Newton had demonstrated no evidence of understanding. 
Despite the value these ideas would eventually have for Newton (the 
reason why Hooke would eventually raise a charge of "plagiary" against 
him), Newton claimed in 1679-1680 to have no time for "philosophy," 
being absorbed in alchemical studies and personal affairs (Westfall 382-
383). 
Thus, even m 1679, Newton claimed to have little interest in what 
would eventually be his greatest work. Nevertheless, Westfall contends 
that in 1679, Newton "stood poised to reject the fundamental tenet of 
Descartes' mechanical philosophy of nature, that one body can act on 
another only by direct contact" (381). Newton's experiments with a 
pendulum and even more importantly, according to Westfall, 
experimental evidence Newton encountered in his alchemical studies 
led him to question the "aether," or medium, that Descartes had 
postulated for transmitting forces between objects not in contact with 
each other (Westfall 377). D. T. Whiteside, in his introduction to a 
publication of early manuscripts of the Principia concurs with Westfall 
that Newton's breakthrough came during the winter of 1679-1680, 
because his correspondence stops discussing the Theory of Vortices at 
~~------ ------ -·--
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that time. So although Newton would not take up senous study of 
celestial mechanics until 1684, he was making the fundamental 
breakthrough that would permit his success in 1679. 
After Hooke's attempts in 1679, Newton did show some interest m 
celestial mechanics. He carried on a short correspondence with John 
Flamsteed concerning cometary motion. And some brief 
correspondence took place with Hooke, Edmund Halley, and Christopher 
Wren as well. However, the event that would spark Newton's serious 
study of celestial mechanics and would lead directly to his publication 
of the Principia in July of 1687 is well known and the story has been 
told often. The event is a visit to Cambridge in August of 1684 by 
Halley, where he asked Newton, who was already known for his 
mathematical prowess, what the orbit of a planet around the sun would 
be, supposing that the force of attraction was the reciprocal of the 
square of the distance between the two objects. Newton promptly 
answered that it was an ellipse, and upon Halley's surprised reaction 
and query as to how he knew, Newton said he had calculated it. After a 
search of his office, Newton claimed to have misplaced the calculation 
(although Westfall suggests that Newton wanted to recheck it), but he 
promised to send it to Halley at his earliest convenience. This 
occurrence set off a chain of events that, largely through the 
encouragement of Halley, led to Newton's almost complete absorption m 
the mechanics of the solar system for the next two and one-half years, 
and to his publication in 1687 of the Principia (Westfall 402-404; Cohen 
"Introduction" 47; Herivel 23; Brewster 296-299). 
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Greek Mathematics 
An even more important, but closely related, question for 
understanding Newton's motivations is when did he reject Cartesian 
algebra for presenting his mathematical results, choosing instead 
Euclidean geometry. The evidence surrounding this question is 
somewhat conflicting, and thus it seems likely that setting a definite 
date is impossible unless new evidence should be forthcoming in the 
future. What seems most likely is that Newton's conversion from both 
Cartesian mathematics and mechanics is a process that took place over a 
period of years. Thus, exactly when he decided to adopt geometry as a 
method of presentation will most likely remain, at least to some degree, 
a mystery. Nevertheless, some useful benchmarks can be set. 
The following passage in Sir Thomas Heath's History of Greek 
Mathematics indicates that while Newton was aware of the ancient 
Greeks' geometry early m his career, his respect for it did not come 
about until much later: 
We are told that Newton, when he first bought a Euclid in 
1662 or 1663, thought it a 'trifling book', as the propositions 
seemed to him obvious; afterwards, however, on Barrow's 
advice, he studied the Elements carefully and derived, as he 
himself stated, much benefit therefrom (370). 
Heath does not make clear the source of this passage. However, if it can 
be trusted, then Newton apparently bought his first volume of Euclid 
only a year or two after arriving at Cambridge, though he clearly did 
not study Euclid seriously until later, when his colleague and 
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predecessor as Lucasian Professor of Mathematics (also translator and 
promoter of the Elements), Isaac Barrow, persuaded him of its value. 
Both Westfall and D.T. Whiteside, the editor of Newton's 
mathematical papers, marshall evidence to suggest that it was during 
1678-1680 that Newton first studied the ancient Greek loci problems 
seriously, but Whiteside also makes clear the limitations of methods for 
dating the manuscripts (Westfall 377-378; Whiteside "Papers IV" 217-
229). According to Whiteside, 
From identifying quirks in the handwriting style of the 
original autograph manuscripts we may, it is true, locate 
their date of composition in a fairly narrow interval of time, 
probably during 1678-9 and certainly not much after 1680, 
but for all other illumination we must necessarily have 
recourse to essentially unprovable conjecture, relying 
extensively on personal prejudices which can be controlled 
only by the internal evidence of the texts themselves 
("Papers IV" 217). 
Both Westfall and Whiteside suggest that two books published in France 
in 1679 (one was Fermat's reconstruction of Apollonius' treatise on 
Plane Loci and of five of the propositions in Euclid's Porisms ) may have 
helped to develop Newton's interest in the ancient Greeks (Westfall 378; 
Whiteside "Papers" 224-225). But Whiteside also demonstrates that 
Newton was studying the ancient Greeks earlier because of a 
mathematical computation on a letter dated about June 1678 ("Papers 
IV" 217). Thus, Newton's first serious study of Greek geometry 
apparently came almost immediately after the 1677-1678 fire in his 
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office, and considering the imprecision m the dating, could have even 
begun somewhat before it. 
In fact, considering the proximity of the dates, and considering the 
evidence presented by Bazerman that Newton had thought of basing his 
argument in definitions and axioms as early as 1672 (113 ), it is not 
implausible that Newton might have used a Euclidean organization for 
his first optical manuscript. However, one last piece of evidence 
suggests that Newton's study of geometry belongs with the 'mechanics' 
period following the fire. After his study of the classic loci problems, 
Newton again studied Descartes' Geometry. Almost immediately, 
Newton began an outright attack upon it. 
This was the first salvo in a long and continuous attack upon both 
Descartes' mathematics and his entire mechanical philosophy 
(culminating in the Principia). Westfall argues, therefore, that Newton's 
study of the ancient Greeks was the catalyst that caused Newton to 
discredit the whole of Descartes' mechanical philosophy. 
Now in the late 1670s, [Newton] stood poised to reject the 
fundamental tenet of Descartes' mechanical philosophy of 
nature, that one body can act upon another only by direct 
contact. Newton's mathematical papers suggests that only a 
wholesale repudiation of his Cartesian heritage would allow 
him to take that step. The repudiation determined not only 
the content but also the form of the Principia (Westfall 381). 
So although Newton was clearly thinking about the use of mathematical 
structures in organizing his optical writing, it seems more likely that his 
adoption of a Euclidean organization was a part of his repudiation of 
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everything Cartesian. And if that 1s the case, then Newton's idea for 
developing his closed text must also be associated with the Principia, his 
wholesale rejection of Descartes' philosophy. 
